Choice under risk is modelled using a piecewise linear version of rankdependent utility. This model can be considered a continuous version of NEO-expected utility (Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant, 2007) . In a framework of objective probabilities a preference foundation is given, without requiring a rich structure on the outcome set. The key axiom is called complementary additivity.
Introduction
When considering choice under risk, evidence suggests that most decision makers are simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic -they are ambivalent. It has been argued before that these departures from expected utility can be explained by taking into account the particular salience of the best and worst outcomes of decisions (Lopes, 1987; Cohen, 1992 ). An additional focus on the worst outcome is akin to pessimism, and on the best outcome is akin to optimism. In this way, the NEO-expected utility model (Chateauneuf et al. 2007 ) elegantly extends expected utility to incorporate ambivalence.
NEO-expected utility successfully organises several robust empirical findings of choice under risk. It allows for optimism and pessimism, in the sense of Wakker (1994) , but also retains expected utility "inside the probability triangle", where violations are less frequently observed (Abdellaoui and Munier, 1998) . Due in most part to its tractable form, NEO-expected utility has been applied extensively. 1 Departures from expected utility are captured using discontinuities in the evaluation formula. Because of these discontinuities, however, the axiomatic foundations of NEO-expected utility are much more complicated than expected utility (see Webb and Zank, 2011) . of rank-dependent utility with a piecewise linear probability weighting function.
Piecewise linear rank-dependent utility (RDU PL
The well known "inverse-S shaped" probability weighting scheme associated with ambivalence is approximated under RDU PL with "stretched-N" shaped probability weighting. RDU PL could be called an empirical generalisation of NEO-expected utility. In terms of observable choices, NEO-expected utility cannot be distinguished from RDU PL . In this sense, the foundational di culties of NEO-expected utility are resolved with very little cost. Furthermore, RDU PL allows for some additional realism. For example, optimism and pessimism have been observed for non-extreme outcomes (see, for example, Wu and Gonzalez, 1996) , which is captured to some extent by RDU PL in a way that is ruled out by NEO-expected utility.
Webb (2015) gave an axiomatisation of the analogue of the RDU PL model under purely subjective uncertainty -the Savage framework. In this paper, RDU PL is axiomatised using objective probabilities -the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework. Only the richness of the probability interval is used, the outcome set can be arbitrary. Hence, the theory may be applied to monetary outcomes, health outcomes, indivisible goods, and so on. The key axiom under risk, called complementary additivity, is more intuitive, easier to test empirically, and the proof is shorter and more direct. The formal definitions are outlined in Section 2. The piecewise linear rank-dependent utility model is presented in Section 3. A simple tradeo axiom, necessary for rank-dependent utility, is presented in Section 4.
The axiomatic foundation of piecewise linear rank-dependent utility presented in Section 5. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Choice Under Risk
There is a set of outcomes X = {x 0 , … , x n }, with n OE 2, and a strict order over outcomes, such that x 0 « 5 « x n . 2 The results of this paper are more elegantly presented describing lotteries in their decumulative form, as in Abdellaoui (2002) and others (Diecidue, Schmidt and Zank, 2009; Webb and Zank, 2011) . We write a
A coordinate p i of a lottery p denotes the decumulative probability of outcome x i , that is, the probability (in the standard sense) of receiving an outcome x i or better. The decumulative probability of x 0 equals one in all lotteries, hence we exclude it from the notation. The set of
We consider lotteries on a finite X for ease of exposition. The results of this paper can be extended to lotteries with finite support on an infinite outcome set, as done in, e.g., Abdellaoui (2002) .
Preferences Ã are defined over L X . Preferences over degenerate lotteries agree with the strict order on outcomes. The set L X is a mixture space, with mixtures of lotteries defined point-wise. For p, q À L X and ↵ À (0, 1),
. If a utility representation exists, preferences Ã are a weak order, that is, they are complete and transitive. 2 A weak order over outcomes can be assumed instead of a strict order. In that case it is required that X has at least three indi erence classes when passing to the quotient. 
Monotonicity

Piecewise Linear Rank-Dependent Utility
Expected utility holds if there is a utility for outcomes u : X ô R such that the map,
represents preferences Ã over L X . Probabilities enter into the expected utility formula linearly. Such preferences, therefore, necessarily satisfy the following axiom:
In the presence of other basic axioms, additivity is su cient for expected utility (see Theorem 5 of Webb and Zank, 2011) . Rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982) holds if there is a utility for outcomes u : X ô R and a strictly increasing probability weighting function w :
represents preferences Ã over L X . Expected utility is the special case of rank-dependent utility, with w the identity function. For a lottery p, let m p denote the worst possible outcome and M p denote the best possible outcome. Security / potential level preferences (Cohen, 1992) are represented by the following map:
where f : X ù X ô R and g : X ù X ô R are real-valued functions.
A popular model of choice under risk is NEO-expected utility (Chateaneuf, Eichberger and Grant, 2007). NEO-expected utility holds if there is a utility for outcomes u : X ô R and parameters , OE 0, with + < 1, such that the map,
represents preferences Ã over L X . NEO-expected utility unites several popular models of choice under risk. It is the special case of rank-dependent utility, with the following probability weighting function:
with , OE 0 and + < 1. NEO-expected utility also coincides with Cohen's security / potential level model when, for all x, y À X, f (x, y) = 1 * * and
with , OE 0 and + < 1.
NEO-expected utility incorporates optimism and pessimism into expected utility in a tractable way. Departures from expected utility are captured using discontinuities in the evaluation formula. Because of these discontinuities, however, the axiomatic foundations of NEO-expected utility are much more complicated than expected utility (see Webb and Zank, 2011) . However, notice that one cannot empirically distinguish between w NEO and any probability weighting w that is continuous on To see this, suppose that, for probability values p 1 < 5 < p n , a finite data set of probability weighting function values have been obtained: {w(p 1 ), … , w(p n )}. Suppose, also, that NEO-expected utility cannot be rejected, so that there is , OE
Then, one cannot reject the following functional form:
where and are functions chosen so that w is increasing and continuous on 
with 0 Õ  Õ . In general, it is not required that and are nonnegative. In principle, w PL can be very steep in the middle region, but remains everywhere strictly increasing and normalised at the extremes. Piecewise linear rank-dependent utility, denoted RDU PL , is the special case of rank-dependent utility with probability weighting function w PL . Expected utility holds as the special case of RDU PL with = = 0.
Elementary Tradeo Consistency
For lotteries involving only two outcomes, there are no observable di erences between expected utility and rank-dependent utility. 3 The simplest objects for the study of probabilistic risk attitudes are, therefore, three-outcome lotteries. Let Y " X be a set of three outcomes. Relabel the outcomes of Y as (2) and let L Y denote the set of lotteries over Y . In decumulative notation, lotteries in L Y can be written (p (1) , p (2) ), (q (1) , q (2) ), and so on. Probability tradeo s are a useful tool for analysing probabilistic risk attitudes. For example, the common consequence e ect (Allais, 1952) suggests that the probability tradeo 11% to 10% seems to have less impact than the probability tradeo from certainty to 99%. For such claims to be clear and meaningful, however, the notion of probability tradeo s having greater, less, or the same impact must be independent of the particular "measuring rod" and coordinate used. Suppose that one observed (r, a) Ì (s, b) but (r, c) Ú (s, d) . Now, r and s in the p (1) -coordinate are the "measuring rod", and the probability tradeo s occur in the p (2) -coordinate.
The initial indi erences above were interpreted to mean a : b probability tradeo is equivalent to that of a c : d probability tradeo , but a di erent conclusion would be reached in this case. The following axiom rules out such inconsistency:
Axiom (Elementary Tradeo Consistency):
For all Y " X, with Y  = 3, and
The adjective "elementary" refers to the fact that the axiom applies only to lotteries involving three outcomes, and also that the axiom uses only indi erences. If X = 3, then elementary tradeo consistency is equivalent to the probability tradeo consistency axiom of Abdellaoui (2002) , except that it is formulated only for indi erences (Köbberling and Wakker, 2003) .
Under rank-dependent utility, the impact of probability tradeo s are characterised entirely by the probability weighting function. Assuming rank-dependent utility with probability weighting function w, the indi erences (a, p) Ì (b, q) and (c, p) Ì (d, q) hold simultaneously if and only if:
Neither the "measuring rods", p and q, nor any suggestion of the tradeo coordinate used, appear in the above equation. Therefore, under rank-dependent utility, these can be replaced, and (r, a) Ì (s, b) holds if and only if (r, c) Ì (s, d) holds.
Observation 1. Rank-dependent utility (hence, also piecewise linear rank-dependent utility) holds only if preferences Ã on L X satisfy elementary tradeo consistency.
In Appendix A, elementary tradeo consistency is used to provide a new preference foundation for rank-dependent utility.
Complementary Additivity
The security / potential level preferences model, of which NEO-expected utility is a special case, captures the behaviour of a decision maker who, when considering a lottery, classifies its outcomes into three classes: certain, impossible, and risky.
That is, respectively, outcomes with decumulative probability one (receiving at least that amount is certain), outcomes with decumulative probability zero (impossible to receive better outcomes), and outcomes with decumulative probability between zero and one (receiving a better or a worse outcome is possible). This corresponds to identifying the very worst outcome, the very best outcome, and the non-extreme outcomes of a lottery. In those models, expected utility holds within, but not necessarily across the classes.
It has been noted by Abdellaoui, l'Haridon and Zank (2010: 51) that assuming the e ects of optimism and pessimism are captured entirely by additional focus on the very best and worst outcomes is somewhat restrictive. Optimism and pessimism have been observed, to a lesser degree, for non-extreme outcomes (Wu and Gonza-lez, 1996). The theory developed here proposes a similar three-criteria distinction, but extends the notions of best and worst to include some non-extreme outcomes.
Consider a decision maker who, when considering a lottery, does the following:
1. Groups outcomes into three classes: likely, unlikely, and moderate. That is, respectively, outcomes with decumulative probability su ciently (subjectively) high, outcomes with decumulative probability su ciently low, and outcomes with decumulative probability between the first two classes.
This stratification corresponds, essentially to the (subjectively defined) worst ranked outcomes, the best ranked outcomes, and the outcomes ranked not so extreme in any particular lottery.
2. Considers likely and unlikely to be duals. That is, an outcome with decumulative probability less than than ↵ is considered "unlikely" if and only if outcomes with decumulative probability greater than (1 * ↵) are considered "likely".
The first assumption above relates to the mental processes used by decision makers when considering lotteries, which falls under the realm of cognitive psychology rather than utility theory. In this vein, Lopes (1987; 1996) has gathered a range of evidence supporting the view that the worst outcomes, best outcomes, and moderate outcomes (in particular, in that order) seem to be especially salient when decision makers think about lotteries. The second assumption is defended more on intuitive grounds. For example, if a decision maker refers to probabilities less than one third as "unlikely", it would seem, linguistically at least, that the remaining probability (larger than two thirds) is su ciently large to be considered "likely". That is, we suppose that saying "receiving this outcome or better is unlikely" means the same thing as "receiving this outcome or worse is likely".
In order to address the question of whether assumptions 1 and 2 are su ciently realistic, overly simple, or just plain false, we require choice-based, testable implications. We now consider what behavioural implications may be reasonable for decision makers using this three-criteria process. The idea pursued here is that, when comparing lotteries, changes that a ect these lotteries without a ecting the subjective, three part structure of the outcomes are handled "rationally". That is, as the additivity axiom of expected utility suggests. 4 Given ↵ À [0, 1], consider the following condition:
i is considered likely in p and q, then the additions above preserve the structure of p and q's three outcome classes. The decision maker then finds the comparison of p + r i and q + r i similar to the comparison of p and q, and does not reverse his preferences. If ↵ were su ciently small, so that x i is considered unlikely in p and q, then the following condition seems more reasonable: The following condition captures the same intuition, considering changes a ecting outcomes that are considered moderate (neither likely nor unlikely). By the assumed dual relationship if ↵ is in the moderate region, then so is (1 * ↵):
Note that, the definition of ↵-outer additivity captures our initial intuition only if
, and the definition of ↵-inner additivity requires the same condition to hold. An axiom is now formulated that holds for all 0 Õ ↵ Õ 1 2 . Because the distinction between "likely", "unlikely" and "moderate" is subjective, we may not know a priori, for a specific 0 Õ ↵ Õ 1 2 , which of the above conditions is relevant. There is, however, a complementarity between these conditions that can be exploited. If assumptions 1 and 2 above are taken seriously, then, whenever ↵ is small enough, we expect ↵-outer additivity to hold. Otherwise, we expect ↵-inner additivity to hold. Hence, when asked, "for which ↵ does ↵-outer additivity hold?" our answer is, "those ↵ for which ↵-inner additivity does not hold." Conversely, when asked, "for which ↵ does ↵-inner additivity hold?" our answer is, "those ↵ for which ↵-outer additivity does not hold." That is, the combination of assumptions 1 and 2 with the "additivity within classes" idea, leads to the following axiom:
, preferences Ã either satisfy ↵-outer additivity, ↵-inner additivity, or both.
By substituting a RDU PL , it can be established that RDU PL necessarily satisfies both -outer additivity and -inner additivity. It follows that RDU PL satisfies ↵-outer additivity for all ↵ Õ , and satisfies ↵-inner additivity for all  Õ ↵ Õ One might conjecture that elementary tradeo consistency can be dropped from Theorem 2 when the outcome set contains more than three outcomes. Example 3 proves that this is not the case. If there are more than three outcomes, then it is possible to derive an additive representation without appealing to elementary tradeo consistency. 5 However, probability weighting cannot be separated from utility unless one further assumes elementary tradeo consistency.
Closing Comments
In this paper we have considered a piecewise linear version of rank-dependent utility for choice under risk. The model can be considered a continuous version of NEO-expected utility. Empirically, evidence that fails to falsify NEO-expected necessarily fails to falsify piecewise linear rank-dependent utility. In terms of obtaining such evidence, the complementary additivity axiom presented here is the critical test. The theorem presented here is perhaps the simplest generalisation of the von-Neumann and Morgenstern theorem that accounts for ambivalent behaviour. 5 In the appendix it is shown that complementary additivity implies a condition called coordinate independence, which is su cient, in the presence of the basic axioms, to derive an additive representation.
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Appendices
Proof: The necessity of the axioms for the representation is routinely demonstrated by substituting the representation. We now establish the su ciency of the axioms for rank-dependent utility. Lemma 18 of Abdellaoui (2002) establishes that conti-nuity on L X follows from weak ordering, monotonicity and Jensen continuity on L X . For Y " X with Y  = 3, elementary tradeo consistency on L Y is identical to the probability tradeo consistency axiom of Abdellaoui (2002) , except that it holds only for indi erences (Köbberling and Wakker, 2003) . This is su cient for rank-dependent utility to hold on each L Y with Y " X and Y  = 3. If X = 3, the proof is complete. Assume that X > 3. Theorem 3.2 of Wakker (1993) implies there exist extended real-valued, continuous, strictly monotone
n are finite valued, except possibly V 1 at zero and V n at one. Additive value functions where s 1 , … , s n > 0. Define a utility function such that u(x 0 ) = 0 and u(x j ) = u(x j*1 ) + s j for j = 1, … , n, and rank-dependent utility holds. ∑ , then É ↵-inner additivity holds for all É ↵ À [↵, 1 2 ]. Let ↵ < be the largest value in [0, 1 2 ] such that ↵ < -outer additivity holds. Let ↵ < be the smallest value in [0, 1 2 ] such that ↵ < -inner additivity holds. 
